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Abstract. We show that state-of-the-art services for creating trusted
timestamps in blockchain-based networks do not adequately allow for
timestamping of web pages. They accept data by value (e.g., images and
text), but not by reference (e.g., URIs of web pages). Also, we discuss
difficulties in repeatedly generating the same cryptographic hash value
of an archived web page. We then introduce several requirements to be
fulfilled in order to produce repeatable hash values for archived web
pages.
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1 Introduction
The Internet Archive has made great efforts to capture and archive much of the
web, allowing anyone to have access to prior states of web pages. We implicitly
trust the archived content delivered by the Internet Archive (IA)1, but with the
current trend of extended use of other public and private web archives, we should
consider the question of validity of archived web pages. For example, if a web
page is archived in 1999 and replayed in 2017, how do we know that it has not
been tampered with during those 18 years?
When replaying the same archived web page in a web browser at different
points in time, a user should be presented with the same content. Figure 1
shows an archived web page, or memento2, captured by a private web archive,
“Michael’s Evil Wayback”3, on July 17, 2017 at 18:51 GMT. This memento is a
copy of the original web page
https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) demonstrate an unexpected result — when replaying the
memento in August 2017, the level of CO2 (or carbon dioxide in the Earth’s
atmosphere) was 406.31 ppm, but when revisiting the same archived page in
October 2017, CO2 became 270.31 ppm. So which one is the “real” archived
1 https://archive.org
2 A memento is an archived version of an original web page [32].
3 We established this archive to demonstrate different scenarios in this paper.
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page? How can we identify whether the content, sent by the archive as a response
to the most recent request, has not been tampered with? In this paper, we
consider the implications of using trusted timestamping to validate archived
web pages.
Timestamping is recording the date and time of when an event occurs. For
example, the HTTP Response headers “Date” and “Last-Modified” are exam-
ples of timestamps referring to different events — “Date” indicates when a server
generated a response message, while “Last-Modified” is the datetime of when
the resource was last modified. A “trusted” timestamp is a timestamp initially
created and verified by a third-party trustworthy service. Blockchain-based net-
works (e.g., Bitcoin [26, 35]) have been receiving increased attention recently as
trustworthy systems for initiating and validating timestamps of digital docu-
ments. Once a file is timestamped in the blockchain, anyone should be able to
prove the existence of the file at a particular point in time.
In this paper, we first show that state-of-the-art timestamping services in
blockchain-based networks do not allow users to submit URIs of web pages in
order to establish trusted timestamps of these types of documents. Second, we
discuss some difficulties in timestamping archived web pages (i.e., mementos)
even if these services start accepting URIs.
Generating a hash value on the content of a memento is one of the cru-
cial parts in the process of timestamping the memento. As shown in Figure 2,
the archived web page will not be directly timestamped in the blockchain. In-
stead, a hash value calculated on the content of the memento is the data to be
timestamped. Thus, it is important to be able to reproduce the same hash of
a particular archived web page over time. As the number of public and private
web archives is increasing [21, 10], we can no longer have the same level of trust
in content delivered by different archives (e.g., content was tampered with in
Michael’s Evil Wayback as Figure 1 shows). It becomes essential to develop a
mechanism for creating and verifying timestamps of archived web pages.
2 Background
2.1 Crawling and Replaying Archived Web Pages
In order to automatically collect portions of the web, some web archives employ
web crawling software, such as the Internet Archive’s Heritrix [29, 25]. Having
a set of seed URIs placed in a queue, Heritrix will start by fetching web pages
identified by those URIs, and each time a web page is downloaded, Heritrix
writes the page to a WARC file [2], extracts any URIs from the page, places
those discovered URIs in the queue, and repeats the process.
The crawling process will result in a set of archived pages. The Internet
Archive, for example, collects over one billion web pages per week [28], and
as of today, it contains 585 billion web pages [6]. To provide access to their
archived pages, many web archives which use OpenWayback [1], the open-source
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(a) Accessing the archived page in August 2017 (CO2 was 406.31
ppm)
(b) Accessing the same archived page in October 2017 (CO2
became 270.31 ppm)
Fig. 1: A change is made in an archived page. Which one is the real archived page?
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Fig. 2: Timestamping a hash value that summarizes a memento in the blockchain.
implementation of IA’s Wayback Machine, allow users to query the archive by
submitting a URI. OpenWayback will replay the content of any selected archived
web page in the browser. One of the main tasks of OpenWayback is to ensure
that when replaying a web page from an archive, all resources that are used to
construct the page (e.g., images, style sheets, and JavaScript files) should be
retrieved from the archive, not from the live web. Thus, at the time of replaying
the page, OpenWayback will rewrite all links to those resources to point directly
to the archive [31]. In addition to OpenWayback, PyWb [3] is another tool for
replaying archived web pages. It is used by Perma [37] and Webrecorder [22].
2.2 Memento
Memento [33, 32] is an HTTP protocol extension that uses time as a new di-
mension to access the web by relating the current web resources to their prior
states. The Memento protocol is supported by most public web archives includ-
ing the Internet Archive. The protocol introduces two HTTP headers for content
negotiation. First, Accept-Datetime is an HTTP Request header through which
a client can request a prior state of a web resource by providing the preferred
datetime (e.g., Accept-Datetime: Mon, 09 Jan 2017 11:21:57 GMT ). Second,
the Memento-Datetime HTTP Response header is sent by a server to indicate
the datetime at which the resource was captured. The Memento protocol also
defines the following terminology:
– URI-R - to identify an original resource from the live Web
– URI-M - to identify an archived version (memento) of the original resource
at a particular point in time
– URI-T - a resource (TimeMap) that provides a list of mementos (URI-Ms)
for a particular original resource
– URI-G - a resource (TimeGate) that supports content negotiation based on
datetime to access prior versions of an original resource
2.3 The Bitcoin Blockchain
Bitcoin [26] is a peer-to-peer electronic cash system built using the Blockchain
technology [35]. A ledger that contains all transactions in Bitcoin is duplicated
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across all nodes in the network (i.e., there is no central agency). The times-
tamp associated with each transaction indicates when the transaction is accepted
in the Bitcoin. Services, such as OriginStamp4, Chainpoint5, and OpenTimes-
tamps6, generate trusted timestamps in Bitcoin for digital documents. Even
though timestamping steps might vary from one service to another, they follow
a common procedure:
1. Receiving a file, a hash, or plain text from a user
2. Generating a hash value of received content
3. Converting the hash to a Bitcoin address
4. Issuing a Bitcoin transaction using the Bitcoin address as a money sender
or receiver
To verify timestamps in Bitcoin at any point in the future, the first three steps
mentioned above are performed. The fourth step then would include issuing a
query through the Bitcoin API to obtain information about any transactions on
the given Bitcoin address. We consider the timestamp associated with the Bitcoin
transaction as a trusted timestamp. Being incorruptible is the key characteristic
of Bitcoin as any change in a transaction or a block requires computational power
that exceeds the entire network, which is theoretically possible but unlikely to
occur practically. The other important feature of Bitcoin is the decentralization
of a distributed ledger which contains all transactions ever made in Bitcoin (i.e.,
the ledger is duplicated across all nodes).
3 Related Work
Some existing work focuses on exploring security issues in web archives. Archived
web pages, similar to live web pages, might change over time for different rea-
sons, such as software or hardware upgrades, the fact that complex technologies
are involved in developing web pages, and malicious attacks. For more critical
archived web resources (e.g., documents acknowledged as evidence in courts), it
is important to find a way to validate content served by a web archive [13].
Lerner et al. [23] discovered four vulnerabilities in the Internet Archive’s
Wayback Machine (i.e., Archive-Escapes, Same-Origin Escapes, Archive-Escapes
+ Same-Origin Escapes, and Anachronism-Injection) that attackers can leverage
to modify a user’s view at the time when a memento is rendered in a browser. The
authors suggested some defenses that could be deployed by either web archives
or web publishers to prevent abusing these vulnerabilities.
Other web archiving researchers created a shared repository in May 2017
maintained by the Harvard Library Innovation Laboratory. They use this plat-
form to discuss potential threats in web archives. Threats would include, for
instance, controlling a user’s account due to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
4 https://originstamp.org
5 https://chainpoint.org/
6 https://opentimestamps.org/
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or Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), and archived web resources reaching out to the
live web. The authors provide recommendations on how to avoid such threats
[11, 12].
Eltgrowth [13] outlines several judicial decisions that involve evidence (i.e.,
archived web pages) taken from the Internet Archive (e.g., court cases like
Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp, and St. Luke’s Cataract
& Laser Institute v. James C. Sanderson). The author mentions that there is an
open question whether to consider an archived web page as a duplicate of the
original web page at a particular time in the past. This concern might prevent
considering archived web pages as evidence.
Yasskin [36] describes several use cases with associated requirements for dis-
tributing copies of web packages. One use case is the authentication process,
which is performed to ensure resources come from particular origins and to val-
idate the content integrity against any attempt to tamper with or modify the
content in transit. The authors did not include a use case where content might
be altered at any point in time in the server.
Tools have been developed to generate trusted timestamps in blockchain-
based networks. OriginStamp [16] allows users to submit plain text, a hash value,
or any file format (e.g., PDF/PNG files). The data is not sent to the Origin-
Stamp’s server. Instead, it is hashed in the user’s browser and only the resulting
hash is transmitted to the server. Once delivered, it will be added to the list
of all hashes submitted by other users. Once per day, OriginStamp generates a
single aggregated hash of all received hashes. This hash is then converted to a
Bitcoin address that will be a part of a new Bitcoin transaction (i.e., the source
or destination of a transaction in Bitcoin). The timestamp associated with the
transaction is considered a trusted timestamp. OriginStamp provides an instant
timestamping in the Bitcoin if a user is willing to pay a Bitcoin transaction fee.
A user can verify a timestamp through OriginStamp’s API or by visiting their
website. The server first receives a hash from a user, then OriginStamp converts
the hash to a Bitcoin address and sends a query to Bitcoin’s API. If any trans-
action involved the given address is returned, the timestamp associated with the
transaction can be used as a proof of existence. In addition to the process of ver-
ifying timestamps through OriginStamp’s website, users may verify timestamps
directly in Bitcoin.
Other services, such as Chainpoint, Tangible.io7, Proof of Existence8, and
OpenTimestamps, are based on the same concept of using Bitcoin to timestamp
digital documents. Some differences between these tools include:
• Cost - The OriginStamp service can be used with no charge unless users
want an instant submission to Bitcoin. Tangible.io’s and Proof of Existence
users, on the other hand, have to pay for the service.
• Generation of aggregated hashes - In OriginStamp, an aggregated hash is
computed by storing all hashes received within a day (i.e., 24 hours) in a file,
which then will be hashed to generate a single aggregated hash. Chainpoint
7 http://tangible.io/en/
8 https://proofofexistence.com
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and OpenTimestamps uses a Merkle Tree [24] to generate one aggregated
hash (i.e., root hash).
• The number of Bitcoin transactions v. hashes - Services like OriginStamp,
ChainPoint, and OpenTimestamps support issuing either one Bitcoin trans-
action per submitted hash or one transaction per aggregated hash. Other
tools, such as Proof of Existence, create one Bitcoin transaction per hash.
• Use - OriginStamp, Tangible.io, and Proof of Existence provide online ser-
vices through their websites that allow users to create or verify trusted
timestamps using a web browser. Chainpoint and OpenTimestamps require
installing client software in order to use the timestamping service.
• Blockchain-based network - Bitcoin is commonly used by all of these ser-
vices to generate trusted timestamps. In addition, Chainpoint can create
timestamps based on other blockchain networks like Ethereum [34].
Even though users of the tools mentioned above can pass data by value, such
as plain text, any file format, or a hash value, they are not allowed to submit data
by reference (i.e., passing a URI of a web page). In other words, these services
are not directly timestamping web pages. The only exception is an additional
service [15] established by OriginStamp. The service works by receiving a URI
from a client and then hashing the content of the web page identified by the
URI. All further steps performed to create or verify timestamps are similar to
the steps mentioned in Section 2.3. Figure 3 (from [15]) shows the UI of this
service where users can search for timestamped web pages by entering a URI.
There are two disadvantages of this additional service. First, the service is no
longer available on the live web9. Second, the hash is only generated on the
HTML content of the main file identified by the URI, ignoring all embedded
resources like images, scripts, and style sheets [15]. As will be illustrated in
Section 4, by not including embedded resources in hash calculation may leave
the page vulnerable to undetected changes.
Various tools (e.g., shell scripts by Branwen [5]) calculate a hash value by
considering all resources constructing a web page (e.g., images and scripts) in
addition to the HTML content. This seems to be a reasonable solution for times-
tamping web resources, but without considering other factors, as we will see in
Section 4, it is difficult to produce a repeatable hash for the same web page over
time.
4 Issues in Generating Cryptographic Hashes of
Mementos
Generating a hash value on the content of a memento is the key part in the pro-
cess of timestamping the memento. As shown in Figure 2, the archived web page
will not be directly timestamped in blockchain-based networks (e.g., Bitcoin and
Ethereum). Instead, the hash value calculated on the content is the data to be
9 https://www.isg.uni-konstanz.de/web-time-stamps/
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Fig. 3: A list of timestamped web pages. Users can search for a particular web page by
typing a URI or text (from [15]).
timestamped. Regardless of the cryptographic hash function (e.g., MD5 or SHA-
256), a resulting hash value should fulfill the following requirement emphasizing
reproducing the same hash of a particular memento at different points in time.
If we download a memento URI-Mx at time tn (denoted as URI-
Mx@tn), download the same memento at time tm (denoted as URI-
Mx@tm), and apply a hash function H on the content of URI-Mx@tn
and URI-Mx@tm, then H(URI-Mx@tn) = H(URI-Mx@tm)
Requirement 1: Repeatable hash values
In this section, we will discuss several difficulties in generating a constant hash
at different points of time for a specific archived web page. Thus, we will observe
more requirements as we advance in our discussion in addition to Requirement 1
above. We will start with a simple scenario where hashes are calculated on only
HTML content of mementos. The discussion then turns toward more complex
scenarios encountered when all resources constructing a memento are included
in the hash calculation.
4.1 Generating hashes on HTML content only
Consider a scenario illustrated in Figure 4 where, in August 2017, a user needs
to generate a hash value based on the content of the archived page
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http://wsdl-maturban.cs.odu.edu:11011/michael/wayback/2017071
7185130/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/
The memento is preserved by Michael’s Evil Wayback and illustrated in Figure
1(a). The user runs a “cURL” command as shown in Figure 5, which will first
download the HTML content of the main page and then generate a SHA-256 hash
value of the content resulting in a hash value that ends with “f521”. Two months
later (i.e., October 2017), the user requests the same archived web page from
the Michael’s Evil Wayback and performs the hash calculation on the returned
HTML content, observing a different hash value that ends with “3790”.
Time
The original web page is published on the web
(https//climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/)
Captured and archived by Michael’s Evil Wayback
(http//wsdl-matubran.cs.odu.edu:11011/michael/wayback/
20170717185130/https://climate..nasa.gov/vital-signs/
carbon-dioxide/)
HTML 
content is 
downloaded 
e834 c71a efda 284f e03a 4eed 4e8c b78e
a581 537b a888 4aec ec29 bd2d 66cb f521
SHA256
Hash 
HTML 
content is 
downloaded 
fc90 88b3 a614 a588 40bd 5387 d93c 16be
824c d2bb b3fa b173 f93f a57d 241a 3790
SHA256
Hash 
December 2014
July 2017
August 2017
October 2017
The archived page has been tampered with by changing the value of COSeptember 2017 2
Fig. 4: An archived web page (http://wsdl-maturban.cs.odu.edu:11011/michael/wayback/
20170717185130/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/) has been tam-
pered with, and the simple approach of generating a hash based on the HTML content
successfully detected the change.
One possible cause of such observation of getting varied hash values is demon-
strated in Figure 4 with a “black hat” icon. Michael’s Evil Wayback has tampered
with the memento, in favor of individuals or organizations who deny that CO2
is one of the main causes of global warming. The latest important CO2 mea-
surement has been changed from 406.31 ppm to 270.31 ppm as shown in Figure
1. By applying the simple approach of computing hashes on the HTML content,
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1
2 % curl -s http://wsdl-maturban.cs.odu.edu:11011/michael/wayback
3 /20170717185130/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-
4 dioxide/ | shasum -a 256
5
6 e834c71aefda284fe03a4eed4e8cb78ea581537ba8884aecec29bd2d66cbf
7 521 -
8
Fig. 5: cURL command to generate a SHA-256 hash of the HTML content only.
the user becomes aware that the retrieved content in October 2017 cannot be
identical to the content retrieved a couple of months earlier.
We focus now on a more complicated scenario where an image or any other
embedded resource constructing the archived page is altered. For instance, the
bottom-right graph of the archived web page shown in Figure 6(b) has been
changing the historical records of CO2. This image is located on the web at
http://wsdl-maturban.cs.odu.edu:11011/michael/wayback/20170717
185130im_/https://climate.nasa.gov/system/charts/15_co2_left_0
61316.gif
It is linked from the main file of the archived page
http://wsdl-maturban.cs.odu.edu:11011/michael/wayback/20170717
185130/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/
Can such change be detected by the “cURL” command shown in Figure 5? The
answer is “no” since it only considers hashing the HTML code of the main file and
not the embedded resources. Figure 7 shows the results of running the command
on the archived page before (Figure 6(a)) and after it is modified (Figure 6(b)).
The hash values are identical, which falsely indicates that the archived page is not
corrupted. Therefore, we should include embedded resources in hash calculation.
4.2 Generating a hash of a composite memento
A composite memento refers to all embedded resources that comprise a memento
[4]. We modified the shell script (see Figure 8) written by Gwern Branwen [5].
The modified script, sha256 include all.sh, computes a final hash by hashing a
text file containing a set of hash values of all embedded resources constructing
a memento (i.e., a composite memento). Figure 9 shows an example of running
this script on the content of a real archived page. Figure 10 shows the results
of computing the hash on the original archived page (Figure 6(a)) and after an
image within the memento is modified (Figure 6(b)). The new script successfully
produces two different hash values. The first one ends with “6e8cb” while the
second hash ends with “a92fb”. This indicates that the memento has been tam-
pered with or altered. Thus, fulfilling Requirement 2 is essential when computing
hashes.
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(a) Accessing the archived page in August 2017.
(b) Accessing the archived page in October 2017
Fig. 6: A memento has been tampered with (modifying an image). The approach of
hashing HTML content only does not detect the change.
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HTML 
content is 
downloaded 
e834 c71a efda 284f e03a 4eed 4e8c b78e
a581 537b a888 4aec ec29 bd2d 66cb f521
SHA256
Hash 
HTML 
content is 
downloaded 
e834 c71a efda 284f e03a 4eed 4e8c b78e
a581 537b a888 4aec ec29 bd2d 66cb f521
SHA256
Hash 
August 2017
October 2017
The change is made in an image, not in the HTML codeSeptember 2017
Fig. 7: An archived web page (http://wsdl-maturban.cs.odu.edu:11011/michael/wayback/
20170717185130/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/) has been tam-
pered with, and the simple approach of generating a hash based on the HTML content
alone does not detect that the archived page is corrupted.
1
2 #!/bin/bash
3 #set -euo pipefail
4
5 rm -rf ˜/tmp_www/*
6 cd ˜/tmp_www/
7
8 USER_AGENT="Firefox 6.4"
9
10 FILE=$(nice -n 20 wget --continue --unlink --page-requisites
11 --timestamping -e robots=off -k
12 --user-agent="$USER_AGENT" "$1" 2>&1
13 | egrep ’Saving to: .*’
14 | sed -e ’s/Saving to: //’ | tr -d ’’)
15
16 let "c=0"
17
18 for TARGET in $FILE; do
19 if [ -f "$TARGET" ]; then
20 let "c++"
21 CONT=$(cat $TARGET)
22 HASH=$(echo "$CONT" | shasum -a 256 | awk ’print $1;’)
23 echo "$HASH" >> "allhashes.txt"
24 fi
25 done
26
27 if [ $c = 1 ]; then
28 FINAL_HASH="$HASH"
29 else
30 FINAL_HASH=$(cat "allhashes.txt" | shasum -a 256
31 | awk ’print $1;’)
32 fi
33
34 echo "Final hash: $FINAL_HASH"
35
36
Fig. 8: A shell script (sha256 include all.sh) to generate a final hash by aggregating all
hash values of the embedded resources in a single temporary file and hashing the file.
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1
2 % sha256_include_all.sh http://wsdl-maturban.cs.odu.edu:11011/
3 michael/wayback/20170717185130/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-
4 signs/carbon-dioxide/
5
6 Final hash: 2fa7ece06402cc9d89b9cfe7a53e4ec31a4417a34d79fee584c
7 01d706036e8cb
8
Fig. 9: An example of generating an aggregated hash using sha256 include all.sh.
main HTML 
file and all 
embedded 
resources
2fa7 ece0 6402 cc9d 89b9 cfe7 a53e 4ec3 
1a44 17a3 4d79 fee5 84c0 1d70 6036 e8cb
295d 3203 7568 9c11 5982 cd52 dc65 ab73 
e28d aaa7 6779 c9de 439c e813 48ca 92fb
SHA256
Hash 
August 2017
October 2017
The change is made in an image, not in the HTML codeSeptember 2017
Aggregated hash
main HTML 
file and all 
embedded 
resources
Aggregated hash
SHA256
Hash 
Fig. 10: An archived web page (http://wsdl-maturban.cs.odu.edu:11011/michael/wayback/
20170717185130/https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/) has been tam-
pered with. The shell script sha256 include all.sh successfully detects that the archived
page is corrupted.
We should hash a composite memento. In most cases this would in-
clude hashing the main HTML file as well as other embedded re-
sources in the memento, such as images, style sheets, JavaScript files,
iframes, and others.
Requirement 2: Hash a composite memento
Although including embedded resources of a memento in a hash calculation
may help identify memento tampering (Requirement 2), it raises more questions
about whether to exclude some of those resources (e.g., archive-specific resources)
for several reasons explained in the next section.
4.3 Excluding archive-specific content
Before sending any requested memento to a client, archives not only insert extra
code for usability (e.g., the IA’s banner) in the original content of mementos but
may also apply some transformation to appropriately replay content in a user’s
browser. An archive performs such transformations for different reasons. First,
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1 <html>
2 <head> ... </head>
3 <body>
4 ...
5 <!--
6 FILE ARCHIVED ON 23:42:15 Apr 6, 2017 AND RETRIEVED FROM THE
7 INTERNET ARCHIVE ON 3:40:16 Apr 7, 2017.
8 JAVASCRIPT APPENDED BY WAYBACK MACHINE, COPYRIGHT INTERNET
9 ARCHIVE.
10
11 ALL OTHER CONTENT MAY ALSO BE PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT (17 U.S.
12 C.SECTION 108(a)(3)).
13 -->
14 </body>
15 </html>
Fig. 11: HTML comments added by the Internet Archive.
all links to embedded resources constructing an archived page are rewritten so
that these resources are retrieved from the archive, not from the live web. For
instance, the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20170705002324/http://www.weeklysta
ndard.com/
contains the logo image
http://www.weeklystandard.com/media/images/logo.png
This link to the logo image is rewriten by the Wayback Machine to point to the
archive
https://web.archive.org/web/20170705161539im_/http://www.weekly
standard.com/media/images/logo.png
Another purpose of such archive-specific content is to inform users that what
they are viewing is actually from an archive rather than the live web. The Inter-
net Archive, for example, adds HTML comments at the end of the main HTML
file of a memento to indicate when the memento was created and retrieved
(Figure 11). In addition, archives insert content to convey information such as
the archive name, current datetime, and copyright-related statements. Jones et
al. [17, 18, 30] explore transformation of original content performed by different
archives and introduce several rules for acquiring mementos and extracting text
from the content.
Figure 12 shows examples of archive-specific content which are not part of the
original content when the memento was initially created. The Internet Archive’s
banner in Figure 12(a) indicates that there are 2,138 mementos available in
the archive for the web page10. By hovering the mouse over the banner and
clicking on a specific date, the corresponding web page will be displayed in the
browser. Figure 12(b) presents a different visualization tool to navigate through
the archived versions of Ulster University’s website11.
10 http://www.ulster.ac.uk/
11 http://webarchive.proni.gov.uk/20150826163149/http://www.ulster.ac.uk/
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(a) A Memento from Internet Archive
(b) From Proni Archive accessed in 2016
(c) Same memento accessed in 2017
Fig. 12: Archive-specific content (marked in red).
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1
2 % curl -I https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/images/
3 toolbar/wayback-toolbar-logo.png
4
5 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
6 Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2017 22:35:53 GMT
7 Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
8 Link: <http://mementoweb.org/terms/donotnegotiate>; rel="type"
9 Accept-Ranges: bytes
10 ETag: W/"4549-1486118270000"
11 Last-Modified: Fri, 03 Feb 2017 10:37:50 GMT
12 Content-Type: image/png
13 Content-Length: 4549
14 Content-Language: en
15
Fig. 13: One way to identify archive-specific resources is to look at the HTTP Response
header “Link” that contains “http://mementoweb.org/terms/donotnegotiate”.
We can identify archive-specific content in archives which support the Me-
mento protocol [32]. As shown in Figure 13, archives should respond with the
HTTP “Link” header containing “http://mementoweb.org/terms/donotnegot
iate” and “rel="type"” to requests for resources which are not mementos and
are excluded from content negotiation based on the time dimension.
We want to avoid including archive-specific content in hash calculations for
two reasons. First, as mentioned, this type of content does not belong to the con-
tent of an original page. Second, resources such as the Wayback Machine’s banner
in Figure 12(a) and the sidebar inserted by Proni’s archive in Figure 12(b) and
Figure 12(c) are expected to change over time due to updates in archive-specific
software (e.g., the Wayback Machine’s software). In addition, archive-specific
resources may carry dynamically-generated data corresponding to the current
state of an archive. For example, the sidebar in Figure 12(b) lists all years in
which mementos are available. In this case, if a user accesses the memento in
2016, all years which have mementos until 2016 will be part of the information in
the sidebar. On the other hand, accessing the same memento in 2017 will result
in having a new updated sidebar to include 2017’s mementos. Another example
of dynamically-generated information is the number of available mementos dis-
played in the Internet Archive’s banner and Proni’s sidebar. Thus, we need to
avoid including these archive-specific resources when calculating hashes.
Resources added by archives are not part of the original content and
should not be included in the hash calculation.
Requirement 3: Avoid archive-specific resources
Extracting “raw” content of archived web pages: Some archives pro-
vide an API or other mechanism to allow users obtain the “raw” content of
a memento (i.e., the original content without any modification). For example,
archives that operate OpenWayback send back raw content when receiving an
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HTTP request with a URI-M containing “id ” appended to a timestamp. For
example
https://web.archive.org/web/20100923005105id_/http://www.cnn.co
m:80/
will return the raw content of the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20100923005105/http://www.cnn.com:8
0/
Even though using id is beneficial for raw content retrieval, it might cause
issues, such as links to resources constructing a memento not being rewritten to
point to an archive, which prevents the memento from being replayed appropri-
ately as Figure 14 shows.
4.4 Excluding any resources from the live web
Archives rewrite all links of embedded resources of a memento to point to the
archive, yet some URIs are not rewritten because they are produced dynamically,
for example, by events triggered by client-side JavaScript. Resources specified
by such links are often retrieved from the live web [7]. Web resources from the
live web are expected to either change or disappear. Thus, we want to avoid such
resources in computing a memento’s hash.
Lerner et al. [23] explore the web archiving “Archive-Escapes” vulnerability
which occurs when requesting live web resources as part of constructing a me-
mento. This may lead to changing a user’s view when browsing a memento. The
authors show a proof of concept implementation (Figure 15(b)) of the Archive-
Escapes attack. Malicious code is injected in the live web resource
http://cdn.projecthaile.com/js/trb-1.js
By requesting this resource as a part of constructing the memento
http://web.archive.org/web/20110901233330/reuters.com
it causes a user’s view to be completely controlled by the malicious code. This
leads to the need for a new requirement.
No resource located on the live web should be part of the hashing
process.
Requirement 4: No resources from the live web
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(a) Requesting the CNN archived page without includ-
ing id option in the URIM: https://web.archive.org/
web/20100923005105/http://www.cnn.com:80/.
(b) Requesting the raw content of the CNN archived
page using id option: https://web.archive.org/web/
20100923005105id /http://www.cnn. com:80/.
Fig. 14: The archived web page vs. its raw content.
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(a) Accessing the archived web page
http://web.archive.org/web/20110901233330/reuters.com page be-
fore the “Archive-Escapes” attack.
(b) Accessing the same archived page after the “Archive-Escapes” at-
tack.
Fig. 15: A proof of concept of “Archive-Escapes” attack – a request to a live web
resource is made when reconstructing a memento (from [23]).
4.5 Archived web pages might be served from a cache
Web archives might use a cache in order to improve performance by speeding up
subsequent requests. The Wayback Machine’s HTTP Response header “X-Page-
Cache” indicates whether delivered content is from the cache (“X-Page-Cache:
HIT”) or not (“X-Page-Cache: MISS”). Although caching has powerful benefits,
the returned content might not reflect what actually is in the archive. Figure 16
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shows that content is not served from the cache (i.e., “X-Page-Cache: MISS”).
The issue is that cache HITs produce a risk of calculating the same hash even if
the archived page has changed. For example, we issued different HTTP requests
for the same memento (Figure 17). The first response was actually not from
the cache with computed MD5 hash ending in “7afd3” while the two responses
that follow were from the cache. The MD5 hash value calculated on the content
of each of the two responses were identical to the first hash value because the
content served from the cache is an exact copy of the content returned upon the
first request. Now, because the content on the cache is only stored for a “short”
period of time (depending on how the caching system is configured) before it is
discarded (or updated), the fourth response was not a cache HIT. The archived
page seems to be changed since we obtain a different MD5 hash value ending in
“b1059”. Thus, we introduce a new requirement when computing a memento’s
hash.
We should avoid considering content returned from a cache as this
does not reflect the current content of the archive.
Requirement 5: Avoid content served from the cache
4.6 Archived web pages might be in flux (changes in TimeMaps)
Archived resources constructing a memento may have different creation dates
(i.e., Memento-Datetime). For example, the main HTML file of the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20170414182743/https://climate.nasa.g
ov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/
was captured on April 14, 2017, while one of the embedded images was captured
on April 13, 2017
https://web.archive.org/web/20170413144604im_/https://climate.nas
a.gov/system/time_series_images/582_co2_2002_09.jpg
A TimeMap [32] contains a list of all available mementos in the archive for a
particular original resource. For example, the TimeMap of the original resource
http://www.bbc.com/ contains a list of 27,770 mementos and is available in the
Internet Archive at
http://web.archive.org/web/timemap/link/http://www.bbc.com/
From this list, we selected and downloaded the following memento several times
https://web.archive.org/web/20170807231028/http://www.bbc.com/
We first downloaded this memento on August 14, 2017. We noticed that the
TimeMap
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1
2 % curl -i http://web.archive.org/web/20130724144801/http://www.c
3 nn.com/
4 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
5 Server: Tengine/2.1.0
6 Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2017 11:10:15 GMT
7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
8 Content-Length: 147311
9 Connection: keep-alive
10 X-Archive-Orig-set-cookie: CG=US:CA:San+Francisco; path=/
11 X-Archive-Orig-expires: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14:48:55 GMT
12 X-Archive-Orig-vary: Accept-Encoding
13 X-Archive-Orig-server: nginx
14 X-Archive-Orig-last-modified: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14:47:16 GMT
15 X-Archive-Orig-connection: close
16 X-Archive-Orig-cache-control: max-age=60, private
17 X-Archive-Orig-date: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14:46:36 GMT
18 X-Archive-Guessed-Charset: utf-8
19 Memento-Datetime: Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14:48:01 GMT
20 Link: <http://www.cnn.com/>; rel="original", <http://web.archi
21 ve.org/web/timemap/link/http://www.cnn.com/>; rel="timemap"; t
22 ype="application/link-format", <http://web.archive.org/web/htt
23 p://www.cnn.com/>; rel="timegate", <http://web.archive.org/web
24 /20000620180259/http://cnn.com:80/>; rel="first memento"; date
25 time="Tue, 20 Jun 2000 18:02:59 GMT", <http://web.archive.org/
26 web/20130723125209/http://www.cnn.com/>; rel="prev memento"; d
27 atetime="Tue, 23 Jul 2013 12:52:09 GMT", <http://web.archive.o
28 rg/web/20130724144801/http://www.cnn.com/>; rel="memento"; dat
29 etime="Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14:48:01 GMT", <http://web.archive.org
30 /web/20130725162936/http://www.cnn.com/>; rel="next memento";
31 datetime="Thu, 25 Jul 2013 16:29:36 GMT", <http://web.archive.
32 org/web/20000620180259/http://cnn.com:80/>; rel="last memento"
33 ; datetime="Tue, 20 Jun 2000 18:02:59 GMT"
34 Content-Security-Policy: default-src ’self’ ’unsafe-eval’ ’uns
35 afe-inline’ data: archive.org web.archive.org analytics.archi
36 ve.org
37 X-App-Server: wwwb-app23
38 X-ts: ----
39 X-Archive-Playback: 0
40 X-location: All
41 X-Page-Cache: MISS
42
43 ...
Fig. 16: Memento is not delivered from the cache as the HTTP Response header “X-
Page-Cache: MISS” indicates.
http://web.archive.org/web/timemap/link/http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/
wwhp/144/cpsprodpb/730D/production/_97235492_p05brd0w.jpg
of one of the embedded images was empty. The archive had not yet captured this
image and responded with “404 NOT FOUND” to a request to the rewritten
link (URI-M)
https://web.archive.org/web/20170807231028im_/http://ichef.bbci.
co.uk/wwhp/144/cpsprodpb/730D/production/_97235492_p05brd0w.jpg
We downloaded the same memento on August 21, 2017. We found that the
image’s TimeMap is no longer empty as it consists of one memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20170807230527im_/http://ichef.bbci.
co.uk/wwhp/144/cpsprodpb/730D/production/_97235492_p05brd0w.jpg
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1
2 % date
3 Mon Oct 2 01:15:18 EDT 2017
4 % curl --silent http://web.archive.org/web/20130724144801/htt
5 p://www.cnn.com/ | md5
6 477b6d923cbb7bf9675a0d2feb37afd3
7
8
9 % date
10 Mon Oct 2 01:16:29 EDT 2017
11 % curl --silent http://web.archive.org/web/20130724144801/htt
12 p://www.cnn.com/ | md5
13 477b6d923cbb7bf9675a0d2feb37afd3
14
15
16 % date
17 Mon Oct 2 01:19:31 EDT 2017
18 % curl --silent http://web.archive.org/web/20130724144801/htt
19 p://www.cnn.com/ | md5
20 477b6d923cbb7bf9675a0d2feb37afd3
21
22
23 % date
24 Mon Oct 2 02:10:24 EDT 2017
25 % curl --silent http://web.archive.org/web/20130724144801/htt
26 p://www.cnn.com/ | md5
27 dda6a9bf091d412cbdc2226ce3eb1059
28
Fig. 17: The first “cURL” request was not served from the cache (i.e., “X-Page-Cache:
MISS”) while the second and third request were cache HITs. After about an hour, the
fourth request was a cache MISS and produces a different hash. This example shows
that cache HITs produce the same hash even though the memento might have changed.
The hash generated on the composite memento on August 14, 2017 ended
in “288d7” which is different from the hash generated for the same composite
memento downloaded on August 21, 2017, ending in “80845”.
Brunelle et al. [8] studied the TimeMaps of 4,000 original resources for three
months and concluded that the number of mementos in TimeMaps changes and,
in some cases, decreases. This will definitely affect how a memento is constructed,
and thus will result in different hash value being generated. In addition. Kelly
et al. [20, 19] discovered that the number of mementos in the TimeMap of an
original web page may vary depending on the tool or the API used to access
the archive (e.g., via the Internet Archive’s web interface12 and the Internet
Archive’s CDX API13).
Changing TimeMaps could affect the computation of hashes. It might
be necessary to estimate when a memento becomes stable within the
archive to avoid issues of having different hashes.
Requirement 6: Be aware of the effect of changing TimeMaps
12 https://archive.org/web/
13 The Wayback CDX Server API: https://github.com/internetarchive/wayback/
tree/master/wayback-cdx-server
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4.7 Dynamic content
Some values are generated on the client-side by JavaScript code which may result
in having random or different values each time the JavaScript code is executed.
Considering resources with random values may cause inconsistencies in hash
calculation. Figure 18 shows a “rainy/thunder” icon when the memento:
https://web.archive.org/web/20130530221910/http://www.cnn.com/
was accessed on September 21, 2017. Reloading the same memento in the browser,
we noticed that the icon changed to be “cloudy”. This happens because the URI
to the icon is generated by JavaScript, which involves retrieving the current
datetime.
Any resources discovered to have randomly generated values should
not be a part of the computation of hashes.
Requirement 7: Avoid using dynamic content in hash calculations
4.8 Changes in HTTP Response headers
We should include values of important HTTP Response headers in hash compu-
tation. For example, we encountered in Figure 16 a scenario where the value of
the HTTP Response header “X-Page-Cache” refers to whether content served
from the cache or not. Another example would be the value of the HTTP Re-
sponse header “Location”. This header is included in the response when the
HTTP response status code is “3xx”. By hashing the value of this HTTP header,
we can identify if mementos are served from different URI-Ms and we want
keep track of such behavior. Another important header is “Content-Type”. For
instance, we may know that the content of an image has not been tampered
with, but it is just the format of the image that changed to PNG, which causes
a different hash. Rosenthal et al. [27] implemented a proof-of-concept system
that demonstrated how an archive can use HTTP content negotiation to trans-
parently migrate resources from one MIME type to another (e.g., image/gif to
image/png). This can be useful if a format type becomes obsolete (as recently
happened with Adobe Flash [9]) or otherwise legally encumbered (as happened
with GIF [14]).
Important HTTP Response headers should be included in the hash
computation.
Requirement 8: Include HTTP Response headers
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(a) Accessing https://web.archive.org/web/20130530221910/http://www.cnn.com/
on September 21, 2017 at 10:12 AM (Rainy/thunder icon).
(b) Reloading the same memento at a different time may produce a different icon
(Cloudy icon).
Fig. 18: An example that shows how randomly generated values might affect the hash-
ing process.
Challenges in Timestamping Archived Web Pages 25
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we emphasize the importance of timestamping archived web pages,
as the number of public and private web archives is increasing, and we do not
have the same level of trust in all archives (e.g., Michael’s Evil Wayback). We
showed that the existing blockchain-based timestamping services do not accept
URIs. They accept data by value, such as images and text. Being able to re-
produce the same hash of a particular archived web page over time is the key
part in the process of generating trusted timestamps. Thus, we discussed several
difficulties of generating repeatable hashes of archived web pages and introduced
several requirements that should be fulfilled when computing hashes. The pro-
posed requirements include:
1. A generated hash must be repeatable (Section 4)
2. Generate a hash on a composite memento (Section 4.2)
3. Exclude archive-specific resources (Section 4.3)
4. Avoid resources from the live web (Section 4.4)
5. Avoid content served from the cache (Section 4.5)
6. Changes in TimeMaps might affect the computation of hashes (Section 4.6)
7. Avoid including dynamic content or randomly generated content (Section
4.7)
8. Include selected HTTP Response headers in hash calculation (Section 4.8)
In future work, we will explore the above requirements by observing a set of
archived web pages from several web archives for a period of time. This will help
us identify the type of changes in the content of archived resources that might
affect generating repeatable hashes.
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